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Abstract
The reorganization of the electricity industry in Spain completed a new step with the start-up of the Derivatives Mar-
ket. One main characteristic of MIBEL’s Derivatives Market is the existence of physical futures contracts; they imply
the obligation to physically settle the energy. The market regulation establishes the mechanism for including those
physical futures in the day-ahead bidding of the Generation Companies. The goal of this work is to optimize coor-
dination between physical futures contracts and the day-ahead bidding which follow this regulation. We propose a
stochastic quadratic mixed-integer programming model which maximizes the expected profits, taking into account fu-
tures contracts settlement. The model gives the simultaneous optimization for the Day-Ahead Market bidding strategy
and power planning production (unit commitment) for the thermal units of a price-taker Generation Company. The
uncertainty of the Day-Ahead Market price is included in the stochastic model through a set of scenarios. Implemen-
tation details and some first computational experiences for small real cases are presented.
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1. Introduction
Recently, there has been a reorganization of the electricity industry. The deregulation of the generation and distri-
bution of electricity carried out in most countries in Europe has changed the problems that the generation companies
(GenCo) have to face. With the introduction of the Electricity Markets, the price of electricity has become a sig-
nificant risk factor. One of the techniques for hedging against market-price risk is participation in futures markets
(Deng and Oren [1]) and, for this reason, the creation of Derivatives Electricity Markets has been a natural step in the
deregulation process.
The most common mechanisms in the Electricity Markets are as follows:
• Out of the market products: the contracts that are traded directly between client and producer as, for example,
bilateral contracts.
• Derivatives Market: pool where the medium term financial and physical derivatives products are traded; futures
contracts, swap options and forward contracts can be negotiated in them.
• Day-Ahead Market: pool where the most of the physical production is traded. Seller and purchase agents submit
their respective bids to the market operator who, the day before the delivery day, matches the bids.
• Intraday Markets: sequence of secondary markets that are used (1) by the system operator to guarantee the
reliability of the system and (2) by the producers and consumers to change the result of the Day-Ahead Market.
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In this paper, we will focus on the Spanish Electricity Market but as a particular example of many other similar
deregulations that have been carried out all over the world. The models presented in this work can be easily applied or
adapted to many others Electricity Markets that contain physical derivatives products and Day-Ahead Market auctions.
On the Spanish mainland, the Electricity Market, which was launched in 1998, includes a Day-Ahead Market
and a set of balancing and adjustment markets. As the introduction of competition and the deregulation process did
not behave as expected, the Spanish Market was improved in 2007 with the start-up of the Iberian Electricity Market
(MIBEL) and some other new regulations. The MIBEL brings together the Spanish and Portuguese electricity systems
and it complements the previous Spanish Electricity Market with a Derivatives Market. Generation companies can
no longer optimize their short-term generation planning decisions without considering the relationship between those
markets. The short-term bidding strategies are based on the GenCo’s day-ahead bid, which is defined as the selling
offer submitted by a GenCo to the Day-Ahead Market operator. It is always a non-decreasing step-wise function
giving the price at which the GenCo offers its electricity generation to the pool.
There are two main derivatives physical products, the bilateral contracts (BC) and the futures contracts (FC). The
BCs are agreements between a generation company and a qualified consumer to provide a given amount of electrical
energy at a stipulated price in a delivering period. The characteristics of the BCs (energy, price and delivering period)
are negotiated between the two parts before the Day-Ahead Market, the MIBEL’s rules state that each GenCo must
notify the scheduling of the BCs to the system and market operator before the closure of the Day-Ahead Market.
The FCs is an medium-term exchange-traded derivative that represents agreements to buy/sell some underlying
asset in the future at a specified price. The main characteristics of a FCs are the asset, the contract size, the delivery
arrangements and period (weeks, months, quarters or years), and the price. In the MIBEL, the FCs are offered through
the Derivatives Market, an average of 2340GWh are traded monthly. In contrast to other Electricity Derivatives
Markets, the delivery arrangements of the MIBEL FCs offer a choice between a physical or financial settlement.
Physical futures contracts have cash settlement and physical delivery whereas financial contracts have cash settlement
only. This physical delivery option is the feature of the FCs that interacts with the GenCo day-ahead bidding process
(OMEL [2]). Thus, although the physical FC is a medium-term product, the energy amount of this FC has to be
physically delivered daily, and included in the day-ahead bid of the GenCo, coupling this way the medium and short
term.
The main differences between the BCs and the FCs is that the first ones are traded between the GenCo and the
consumer out of the market meanwhile the FCs are traded at the Derivatives Market. Moreover, the quantity committed
at the BCs is not bid to the Day-Ahead Market while the MIBEL rules forces the quantity committed at FCs to be bid
to the Day-Ahead Market through a sale offer with a bid price of 0e/MWh. Among this derivatives products, we will
focus on the physical futures contracts.
In liberalized electricity markets, a GenCo must build an hourly bid that is sent to the market operator, who
selects the lowest price among the bidding companies in order to match the demand. Some earlier studies give the
optimal bidding quantity once the expected distribution of the spot prices is known (Shrestha et al. [3], Triki et al.
[4], Musmanno et al. [5]) but do not propose any explicit modelization of the optimal bid. Conejo et al. [6] proposes
an optimal stepwise bidding strategy for a price-taker GenCo based on the units characteristics, the expected spot
price, and the optimal generation. Furthermore, Gountis and Bakirtzis [7] considers the approximation of stepwise
bid curves by linear bid functions based on the marginal costs and the optimal generation quantity. Nabona and Pages
[8] gives a three stage procedure to build the optimal bid based on the optimal generation quantity and the zero-price
bid. Also, Ni et al. [9] uses the concept of price-power function, which is similar to the matched energy function used
in our work, to derive the optimal bid curves of a hydro-thermal system. Nowak et al. [10] and Fleten and Kristoffersen
[11] also distinguish between the variables representing the bid energy and those corresponding to the matched energy
in the case of a price-taker GenCo. In particular, Fleten and Kristoffersen [11] has some aspects that are very related
to this work; it presents a stochastic programming model to optimize the unit commitment and the day-ahead bidding
of a hydropower producer in the Nord Pool. Moreover, general considerations about optimal bidding construction in
electricity markets can be obtained in Anderson and Philpott [12] and Anderson and Xu [13]. Neither of these studies
mentioned includes FCs.
Some different approaches to the inclusion of FCs in the management of a GenCo can be found in the electricity
market literature. Most of the literature defines forward contracts as contracts with a physical settlement and futures
contracts as contracts with a financial settlement. The main theoretical differences between these two kinds of deriva-
tives products is the level of standardization and the kind of market where they are traded (Hull [14]). We focus on
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the inclusion of physical derivatives products in the short-term management of a GenCo, other general considerations
about FCs can be found in many works, for instance, Hull [14], Collins [15], Neuberger [16] or Carlton [17].
Prior to deregulation, Kaye et al. [18] illustrates how physical and financial contracts can be used to hedge against
the risk of profit volatility, allowing for flexible responses to spot price. After Day-Ahead and Derivatives Markets
start-up, Bjorgan et al. [19] presents a theoretical framework for the integration of FCs into the risk management of a
GenCo. Also, Chen et al. [20] presents a bidding decision making system for a GenCo taking into account the impacts
of several types of physical and financial contracts; this system is based on a market-oriented unit commitment model,
a probabilistic local marginal price simulator, and a multi-criteria decision system. Furthermore, Conejo et al. [21]
optimizes the forward physical contracts portfolio up to one year, taking into account the day-ahead bidding; the
objective of the study is to protect against the pool price volatility through FCs. Moreover, Guan et al. [22] optimizes
in a medium-term horizon the generation asset allocation between different derivatives products and the spot market,
taking into account short-term operating constraints; it considers the known price of the contracts and forecasts the
spot price. In a different framework, Musmanno et al. [5] considers the Italian bilateral contracts in a similar way to
ours FCs but without developing an explicit bidding function. Once again, neither of this studies proposes a explicit
bidding function that coordinates the day-ahead bidding with the economic dispatch of the futures contracts. From
another point of view, Tanlapco et al. [23] does a statistical study of the reduction in risk due to forward contracts; it
is shown that, for a GenCo, the electricity FCs are better to hedge price risk than other related futures as crude oil or
gas futures contracts.
As stated above, we are dealing with a new electricity futures contract situation due to the MIBEL definition
of physical FCs, hence, as far as we know, there is no previous work dealing with the short-term management of
the GenCo which includes the coordination between day-ahead bidding strategies and physical futures settlement
following the Iberian Market rules. The MIBEL regulation (OMEL [2]) describes the coordination between this
physical FCs portfolio and the day-ahead bidding mechanism of the GenCo. That regulation obliges the GenCo to
determine its generation scheduling in order to be able to cover those obligations and to determine its optimal offer,
taking into account those FCs. Following the idea that the participation in the Spot and the Derivatives Markets has
to be studied jointly, the main objective of this work is to build a stochastic programming model which includes
the coordination between physical FCs and Day-Ahead Market bidding following the MIBEL rules. In other words,
we want to see how the inclusion of FCs in the model affects the short term bidding strategies of the GenCo in the
Day-Ahead Market.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• A new quadratic mixed-integer stochastic programming model, for the optimal day-ahead bid with Future Con-
tracts problem (DABFC) that maximize the benefits arising from the Day-Ahead Market with the integration of
the energy of the Physical Futures Contract in the Day-Ahead Market.
• A theoretical study of the solutions of the DABFC model that provides, for the very first time, the analytical
expression of the optimal bid functions that ensures the maximization of the long run expected benefits of those
GenCos that participates in the Day-Ahead Market having FC obligations.
• A detailed validation of the DABFC model with real data coming from the MIBEL Iberian Electricity Market
showing the influence of the physical Futures Contracts in the GenCo’s optimal bidding strategy.
In section 2, the stochastic programming model for the coordination between day-ahead bidding and the physical
futures contract portfolio -taking into account thermal unit operational constraints- is presented. In section 3, the
optimal bid function is developed and its properties are described. In section 4, a detailed case study is solved and
analyzed. Finally, in section 5, some relevant conclusions are presented.
2. Model
2.1. Coordination between Day-Ahead and Derivatives Markets
As stated above, the MIBEL regulation OMEL [2] describes the coordination between the physical futures con-
tracts portfolio and the day-ahead bidding mechanism (Fig. 1), i.e. how to include the result of the medium-term
physical products into the short-term bidding strategies. This coordination is structured in the following three phases:
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Figure 1: Representation of the system under study at period t
1. For every derivatives contract in which the GenCo is interested, it has to define the Term Contract Units (UCP
in the MIBEL’s notation) which are virtual units allowed to be offered in the Derivatives Market. Each UCP is
formed by the subset of the physical units of the GenCo which will generate the energy to cover the corresponding
contract. For each contract, a physical unit can only participate in one virtual UCP.
2. Two days before the delivery date the GenCo receives from the Derivatives Market Operator, OMIP [24] the
quantity that every UCP has to produce in order to cover the matched FCs. This information is also sent to the
Day-Ahead Market Operator, OMEL [25].
3. OMEL demands that every GenCo commits the quantity designated to FCs through the Day-Ahead Market
bidding of the physical units that form each UCP. This commitment is made by the so called instrumental price
offer, that is, a sale offer with a bid price of 0e/MWh (also called price acceptant). It is noteworthy that this is
the main difference between FCs and BCs because, contrary to the FCs, the energy committed at the BCs must
be excluded from the MIBEL’s Day-Ahead Market bid.
That regulation implies that the GenCo has to determine its unit commitment in order to be able to cover those
obligations and it has to determine its optimal bid by taking into account those instrumental price offers. Due to the
algorithm the market operator uses to clear the Day-Ahead Market, all instrumental price offers will be matched (i.e.
accepted) in the clearing process, that is, this energy shall be produced and will be remunerated at the spot price.
Following MIBEL’s rules, if we are optimizing today we focus on tomorrow’s Day-Ahead Market because we
have to submit tomorrow’s bidding. Thus, the optimization horizon is at 24-hour intervals; this set of intervals is
denoted as T . The proposed short-term bidding strategies are addressed to a price-taker GenCo. The generation units
to be considered are the thermal units with participation in the auction process; these thermal units have a quadratic
cost function that defines the relationship between the energy generation (MWh) and the fuel cost. Thus, the relevant
parameters of a thermal unit are:
• quadratic generation costs with constant, linear and quadratic coefficients, cbi (e), cli (e/MWh) and cqi (e/MWh)2
respectively, for the ith unit.
• Pi and Pi the upper and lower bound, respectively, on the energy generation (MWh) of a committed unit i.
• start-up, coni , and shut-down, co f fi , costs (e) for the ith unit.
• minimum operation and minimum idle time, toni and to f fi respectively, for the ith unit., i.e., the minimum number
of hours that the unit must remain in operation once it is started up and the minimum number of hours that the
unit must remain idle once it has been shut down before being started up again, respectively.
2.2. First stage binary variables and thermal units operation constraints
The formulation of the start-up and shut-down processes follows Nabona and Pages [8]. Let uti ∈ {0,1} be a first-
stage binary variable expressing the off-on operating status of the ith unit over the tth interval (uti = 1 if committed,
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uti = 0 if uncommitted). The values of uti and u(t+1)i must obey certain operating rules in order to take into account
the constraints of the minimum in service and idle time. It is necessary to introduce two extra binary variables eti and
ati for each uti. Let eti ∈ {0,1} be a start-up indicator for the ith unit. It has a value of one in all intervals t where the
ith unit has changed from u(t−1)i = 0 to uti = 1, and zero elsewhere. Similarly, ati ∈ {0,1} is a shut-down indicator
for the ith unit. It should have a value of one in all intervals t where u(t−1)i = 1 to uti = 0, and zero otherwise. The
following three sets of constraints unambiguously model the commitment variable uti and the start-up and shut-down
variables eti and ati:
uti−u(t−1)i− eti +ati = 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (1)
eti +
min{t+toni ,|T |}
∑
k=t
aki ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (2)
ati+
min{t+to f fi ,|T |}
∑
k=t+1
eki ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (3)
2.3. First stage continuous variables and futures contracts covering constraints
Let qti be the first-stage variable standing for the energy of the instrumental price offer, that is, the energy bid by
unit i to the tth Day-Ahead Market at 0e/MWh. If variable fti j represents the energy of the jth FC allocated to thermal
unit i at period t, then the following constraints must be satisfied:
∑
i∈I j
fti j = L j ∀t ∈ T, ∀ j ∈ F (4)
qti ≥ ∑
∀ j∈Fi
fti j ∀i ∈ I ∀t ∈ T (5)
Piuti ≤ qti ≤ Piuti ∀i ∈ I ∀t ∈ T (6)
fti j ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀ j ∈ F (7)
where the known parameters Fi, I j and L j are, respectively, the subset of contracts in which unit i participates, the
set of thermal units that participates in contract j (the units in all the UCPs that participate in the contract j) and
the energy that has to be settled for contract j. Constraint (4) ensures that the energy of the jth futures contracts
L j will be completely dispatched among all the committed units of its associated UCPs. Constraints (5) formulate
the MIBEL’s rule that forces the energy of the future contracts to be bid through the instrumental price offer, that
is to say, the variable qti represents the quantity of the instrumental price bid and it must be not less than the sum
of the energy allocated to FCs. The lower bound qti ≥ Piuti prevents committed thermal units from being matched
below their minimum generation limit meanwhile the upper bound qti ≤ Piuti prevents production levels above the
operational limit (6). It is interesting to remark that if we include BC instead of FC, only the constraint (4) will remain
unchanged while all other constraints and the results presented in Section 3 will change. All this differences between
the modelization of FCs and BCs are due to the specific MIBEL rules for each product.
2.4. Second stage variables: matched energy
The formulation of the objective function of the present model will include variables representing the value of the
matched energy for the committed thermal unit i on the tth Day-Ahead Market. For the moment, the matched energy
will be loosely defined as the accepted energy in the clearing process; that is, the energy that the thermal i should
generate at period t and that will be rewarded at the clearing price. This matched energy, which plays a central role
in our model, is uniquely determined by the sale bid and the clearing price. A sale bid in the MIBEL’s Day-Ahead
Market consists of a stepwise non-decreasing curve defined by up to 10 energy (MWh)-price(e/MWh) blocks. As
usual in this kind of work (see Gountis and Bakirtzis [7]) we will consider a simplified modelization of the true sale
bid through the so called bid function λ bti , not necessarily stepwise:
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Definition 1 (Bid function). A bid function for the thermal unit i is a non-decreasing function defined over the in-
terval [0,Pi] that gives, for any feasible value of the bid energy pbti, the asked price per MWh from the Day-Ahead
Market:
λ bti : [0,Pi] −→ ℜ+∪0
pbti 7−→ λ bti(pbti)
(8)
For a given bid function λ bti the matched energy associated with the clearing price λ dt , pmti is defined through the
matched energy function
Definition 2 (Matched energy function). The matched energy associated with the bid function λ bti is defined as the
maximum bid energy with an asked price not greater than the clearing price λ dt , and is represented by the function:
pmti (λ dt )
def= max{pbti ∈ [0,Pi] |λ bti(pbti)≤ λ dt } (9)
The clearing price λ dt is a random variable that will be modeled through a set of scenarios S with associated spot
prices λ d,s = {λ d,s1 , . . . ,λ d,sT } and probabilities Ps = P(λ d,s), s ∈ S. Each one of these scenarios has, for each period t,
a corresponding matched energy that will be represented in the model by the second stage variable psti. Although our
model will be developed without any assumption on the specific expression of the bid function λ bti it is necessary, for
the sake of the model’s consistency, to assume the existence of a bid function with a matched energy function (9) that
agrees with the optimal value of variables psti, i.e.:
Assumption 1. For any thermal unit i committed at period t there exists a bid function λ bti such that:
pmti (λ
d,s
t ) = p
s∗
ti ∀s ∈ S (10)
with ps∗ti the optimal value of variable p
s
ti
Notice that the existence of such a bid function is not evident, as all scenarios must prove simultaneously equal (10).
In Section 3 it will be proved that a bid function λ bti satisfying (10) (optimal bid) always exist.
The matched energy psti is related to the rest of the first stage variable through the following set of constraints:
psti ≤ Piuti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (11)
psti ≥ qti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (12)
qti ≥ Piuti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (13)
This set of constraints substitutes the bounds on qti defined in (6).
2.5. Objective function
The expected value of the benefit function B can be expressed as:
Eλ d [B(u,a,e, p)] = ∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀ j∈F
(
λ fj −λ
d
t
)
L j (14)
− ∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀i∈I
[
coni eti + c
of f
i ati
]
(15)
+ ∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀i∈I
∑
∀s∈S
Ps
[
λ d,st psti−
(
cbi uti + c
l
i p
s
ti+c
q
i (p
s
ti)
2
)]
(16)
where:
(14) is a constant term, which would be excluded from the optimization, and corresponds to the incomes of the FCs,
which are settled by differences. λ fj represents the futures settlement price and λ
d
t =∑s∈S Psλ
d,s
t is the mean of
the Day-Ahead Market price scenarios.
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(15) is the on/off fixed cost of the unit commitment of the thermal units. This term is deterministic and does not
depend on the realization of the random variable λ dt .
(16) represents the expected value of the benefit from the Day-Ahead Market, where Ps is the probability of scenario
s. The first term, λ d,st psti, computes the incomes from the Day-Ahead Market due to a value psti of the matched
energy, while the term between parentheses corresponds to the expression of the quadratic generation costs. Of
course, cbi uti could have been added to the deterministic term (15), as it doesn’t depend on the scenario, but it
has been conserved in (16) for the sake of clarity.
All the functions appearing in Eqs. (15) and (16) are linear except the term (16), which is concave quadratic
(cqi ≥ 0, see Table 4.1).
2.6. The Day-Ahead Bid with Futures Contracts problem
The full model developed in the preceding sections, the so-called Day-Ahead Bid with Futures Contracts problem
can be formulated as:
(DABFC)
minimize
p,q, f ,a,e,u
∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀i∈I
(
coni eti + c
o f f
i ati + c
b
i uti+∑
s∈S
Ps
[
(cli −λ d,st )psti + cqi (psti)2
])
(17)
s.t.
∑
i∈I j
fti j = L j ∀t ∈ T, ∀ j ∈ F (18)
qti ≥ ∑
j∈Fi
fti j ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (19)
uti−u(t−1)i− eti+ati = 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (20)
eti +
min{t+toni ,|T |}
∑
k=t
aki ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (21)
ati +
min{t+to f fi ,|T |}
∑
k=t+1
eki ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (22)
psti ≤ Piuti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (23)
psti ≥ qti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (24)
qti ≥ Piuti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (25)
fti j ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀ j ∈ F (26)
uti,ati,eti ∈ {0,1} ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (27)
This formulation corresponds to a mixed continuous binary linearly constrained minimization problem with con-
cave quadratic objective function. In the next sections the properties of the optimal solutions of the (DABFC) problem
will be studied.
3. Optimal Bid
The preceding model (17)-(27) is built on the assumption 1, which presumes the existence of a bid function λ bti
with a matched energy function consistent with the optimal solution of the (DABFC) problem, i.e.:
pmti (λ
d,s
t ) = p
s∗
ti ∀s ∈ S (28)
The objective of this section is the development of such a bid function, called the optimal bid function λ b∗ti (pbti).
In order to derive this optimal bid function, the properties of the optimal solutions of the problem (17)-(27) will
be studied in the next section and used to derive the expression of the optimal matched energy ps∗ti in terms of the
instrumental energy bid q∗ti.
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3.1. Optimal matched energy
Let x∗′= [u∗,a∗,e∗, p∗,q∗, f ∗]′ represent the optimal solution of the (DABFC) problem. Fixing the binary variables
to its optimal value u∗, a∗ and e∗ in the formulation of the (DABFC) problem, we obtain the following convex quadratic
continuous problem:
(DABFC∗) :
minimize
p,q, f
∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀i∈I∗ont
∑
s∈S
Ps
[
(cli −λ d,st )psti+ cqi (psti)2
]
(29)
s.t.
∑
i|i∈I j∩I∗ont
fti j = L j ∀t ∈ T, ∀ j ∈ F (30)
qti ≥ ∑
j∈Fi
fti j ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont (31)
psti ≤ Pi ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (32)
psti ≥ qti ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (33)
qti ≥ Pi ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont (34)
fti j ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀ j ∈ F (35)
with I∗ont := {i ∈ I | u∗ti = 1}, the set of thermal units committed at time ”t”. Obviously, the optimal solution of this
continuous problem should coincide with the optimal value of the continuous variables of the original (DABFC)
problem, p∗, q∗ and f ∗. The (DABFC∗) problem is separable by intervals, being the problem associated with the tth
time interval in standard form (Luenberger [26]):
(DABFC∗t ) :
minimize
pt ,qt , ft
∑
∀i∈I∗ont
∑
s∈S
Ps
[
(cli −λ d,st )psti + cqi (psti)2
]
(36)
s.t.
∑
i|i∈I j∩I∗ont
fti j−L j = 0 ∀ j ∈ F (pit j) (37)
∑
j∈Fi
fti j−qti ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (µ˜ti) (38)
psti−Pi ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (µsti) (39)
qti− psti ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (µˆsti) (40)
Pi−qti ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (µ ti) (41)
− fti j ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀ j ∈ F (µ˘ti j) (42)
where pi , µ˜ , µ , µˆ , µ and µ˘ represent the Lagrange multiplier associated with each constraint.
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the (DABFC∗t ) problem can be expressed as:
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Ps
[(
cli −λ d,st
)
+2cqi p
s∗
ti
]
+
+µsti− µˆsti = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (43)
−µ˜ti−µ ti + ∑∀s∈S
µˆsti = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (44)
µ˜ti+pit j− µ˘ti j = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀ j ∈ Fi (45)
µ˜ti
(
∑
j∈Fi
fti j−q∗ti
)
= 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (46)
µsti
(
ps∗ti −Pi
)
= 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (47)
µ
ti
(Pi−q∗ti) = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (48)
µˆsti (q∗ti− ps∗ti ) = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (49)
µ˘ti j f ∗ti j = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀ j ∈ F (50)
µ˜ti, µsti, µ ti, µˆ
s
ti, µ˘ti j ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀ j ∈ F, ∀s ∈ S (51)
The (DABFC∗t ) problem is convex (c
q
i ≥ 0) and then the system (43)-(51) represents the necessary and sufficient
optimality conditions of the (DABFC∗t ) problem and, consequently, of the (DABFC
∗) problem. Therefore the solution
set of the preceding KKT system defines the value of variables psti, qti and fti j over the optimal solution of the
(DABFC) problem associated with I∗ont . The following lemma states this result:
Lemma 1. Let x∗′ = [u∗,a∗,e∗, p∗,q∗, f ∗]′ be an optimal solution of the (DABFC) problem. Then, for any x∗ there
exists Lagrange multipliers, µ˜ , µ , µˆ , µ and µ˘ such that the value of variables p∗, q∗ and f ∗ satisfy the KKT system
(43)-(51). Conversely, for any solution p∗, q∗ and f ∗ of the KKT system (43)-(51) associated with I∗ont the correspon-
dent solution x∗ is optimal for the (DABFC) problem.
The fact that any solution of the (DABFC) problem must satisfy the system (43)-(51) will be exploited in the next two
lemmas to derive the expressions of the optimal matched energy associated with scenario s:
Lemma 2 (Optimal matched energy, quadratic costs). Let x∗ be an optimal solution of the (DABFC) problem.
Then, for any unit i with quadratic convex generation cost (i.e. cqi > 0) committed at period t (i.e. i ∈ I∗ont ), the
optimal value of the matched energy ps∗ti can be expressed as:
ps∗ti = max{q∗ti, pd,sti } (52)
where pd,sti is the constant parameter
pd,sti =

Pi if θ sti ≤ Pi
θ sti if Pi ≤ θ sti ≤ Pi
Pi if θ sti ≥ Pi
(53)
with
θ sti =
(
λ d,st − cli
)
/2cqi (54)
Proof As lemma 1 establishes, any optimal solution of the (DABFC) problem must satisfy the KKT system (43)-(51).
As cqi > 0, equation (43) allows variable p
s∗
ti to be expressed as:
ps∗ti =
λ d,st − cli
2cqi
+
µˆsti−µsti
2cqi Ps
= θ sti +
µˆsti−µsti
2cqi Ps
(55)
Equations (39)-(42) establishes that any optimal solution x∗ of the (DABFC) problem must satisfy that
Pi ≤ q∗ti ≤ ps∗ti ≤ Pi (56)
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To derive the relationships (52), the solution of the KKT system will be analyzed in the five cases among which any
optimal solution of the (DABFC) problem could be classified according to (56). The rationale of the demonstration
is to proof that, in all cases, the expression of the variable ps∗ti derived from the KKT system (43)-(51) coincides with
(52):
(a) Pi < q∗ti = ps∗ti = Pi : This is a trivial case, because, by definition (53), p
d,s
ti ≤ Pi, and then ps∗ti = max{q∗ti =
Pi, p
d,s
ti ≤ Pi}= Pi.
(b) Pi ≤ q∗ti < ps∗ti =Pi : Condition (49) gives µˆsti = 0 that, together with the non-negativity of the lagrange multipliers
µsti and equation (55) sets Pi ≤ θ sti and, by definition (53), pd,sti = Pi. Then ps∗ti = max{q∗ti < Pi, pd,sti = Pi}= Pi
(c) Pi ≤ q∗ti < ps∗ti < Pi : In this case, conditions (47) and (49) give µsti = µˆsti = 0, that, together with equation (55)
gives ps∗ti = θ sti. Then, as it is assumed that Pi < ps∗ti < Pi, so is θ sti and, by definition (53), p
d,s
ti = θ sti = ps∗ti > q∗ti.
Therefore ps∗ti = max{q∗ti, pd,sti = θ sti > q∗ti}= pd,sti
(d) Pi < q∗ti = ps∗ti < Pi : In this case, condition (47) forces µ
s
ti = 0 which, in combination with equation (55) and
condition µˆsti ≥ 0 gives ps∗ti ≥ θ sti. As we are assuming that q∗ti = ps∗ti , then q∗ti ≥ θ sti also holds. As θ sti ≤ ps∗ti < Pi
definition (53) sets a value of pd,sti that will be either θ sti or Pi, depending whether θ sti > Pi or θ sti ≤ Pi respectively.
Nevertheless, in both cases pd,sti ≤ q∗ti, and then ps∗ti = max{q∗ti, pd,sti ≤ q∗ti}= q∗ti
(e) Pi = q∗ti = ps∗ti < Pi : Condition (47) sets µ
s
ti = 0 which, by taking into account equation (55) and µˆsti ≥ 0, provides
ps∗ti = Pi ≥ θ sti. Then, by definition (53), pd,sti = Pi, and ps∗ti = max{q∗ti = Pi, pd,sti = Pi}= Pi ¤
Lemma 3 (Optimal matched energy, linear costs). Let x∗ be an optimal solution of the (DABFC) problem. Then
for any unit i with linear generation cost (i.e. cqi = 0) committed at period t (i.e. i ∈ I∗ont ), the optimal value of the
matched energy ps∗ti can be expressed as:
ps∗ti =
{
q∗ti if λ
d,s
t ≤ cli
Pi if λ d,st > cli
(57)
Proof As lemma 1 sets forth, any optimal solution of the (DABFC) problem must satisfy the KKT system (43)-(51).
When cqi = 0 equation (43) can be expressed as:
µˆsti−µsti = Ps
(
cli −λ d,st
)
(58)
with Ps the probability of scenario s. There are three possible cases:
(a) λ d,st < cli : in this case equation (58) implies that µˆsti > µ
s
ti which gives rise to two different situations. In the first
one µˆsti > µ
s
ti > 0, that, together with equations (47) and (49) gives p
s∗
ti = q
∗
ti = Pi. In the second one µˆsti > µ
s
ti = 0
and the same KKT conditions forces ps∗ti = q
∗
ti ≤ Pi
(b) λ d,st > cli : now equation (58) sets µ
s
ti > µˆsti, which again defines only two possibilities. In the first one the strict
inequalities of µsti > µˆsti > 0 hold and, considering equations (47) and (49), set ps∗ti = q∗ti = Pi. In the second one,
µsti > µˆsti = 0 which, after equations (47) and (49), allows the matched energy to be expressed as ps∗ti = Pi ≥ q∗ti.
(c) λ d,st = cli : in this case equation (58) gives µˆsti = µ
s
ti. Two cases must be analyzed here. In the first one, where
µˆsti = µ
s
ti = 0, the KKT system (43)-(51) doesn’t impose any condition over the relation between p
s∗
ti , q
∗
ti and the
bound Pi. Therefore, for a given optimal solution x∗ of the (DABFC) problem, any feasible value of the variables
ps∗ti and q
∗
ti are equally optimal, in particular, the value p
s∗
ti = q
∗
ti. The second case to be analyzed is the case
where µˆsti and µ
s
ti are both strictly positives. Then, equations (49) gives p
s∗
ti = q
∗
ti. ¤
Lemmas 2 and 3 establish the expressions of the optimal matched energy variable for any spot price λ d,st at any
optimal solution of the (DABFC) problem. The bid strategies consistent with such a matched energy will be developed
in the next section.
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3.2. Optimal bid function
In section 2.4 the concepts of bid and matched energy functions were introduced. The matched energy function
associated with a given bid function λ bti was defined as
pmti (λ dt )
def= max{pbti ∈ [0,Pi] |λ bti(pbti)≤ λ dt }
Assumption 1 supposes the existence of a bid function, coherent with the (DABFC) problem, in the sense expressed
in the following definition:
Definition 3 (Bid functions’s optimality conditions). Let x∗′ = [u∗,a∗,e∗, p∗,q∗, f ∗]′ be an optimal solution of the
(DABFC) problem. The bid function λ b∗ti of a thermal unit i committed at period t (i.e. i ∈ I∗ont ) is said to be optimal
w.r.t. the (DABFC) problem and solution x∗ if the value of the matched energy function associated with any scenario’s
clearing price λ d,st , pmti (λ
d,s
t ), coincides with the optimal matched energy ps∗ti given by expressions (52) and (57).
The equivalence pmti (λ
d,s
t ) ≡ ps∗ti assures us that, if a GenCo submits systematically optimal bid functions to the day-
ahead market, the expected value of the benefits will be maximized, as long as the actual behaviour of the clearing
price λ dt has been captured by the set of scenarios S. The next lemma develops the expression of the optimal bid
function associated with the (DABFC) problem:
Lemma 4 (Optimal bid function). Let x∗′ = [u∗,a∗,e∗, p∗,q∗, f ∗]′ be an optimal solution of the (DABFC) problem
and i any thermal unit committed on period t at the optimal solution (i.e. i ∈ I∗ont ). Then:
(i) If the generation cost is quadratic convex, the bid function:
λ bq∗ti (p
b
ti) =
{
0 if pbti ≤ q∗ti
2cqi p
b
ti + c
l
i if q
∗
ti < p
b
ti ≤ Pi
(59)
is optimal w.r.t. the (DABFC) problem and the optimum x∗.
(ii) If the generation cost is linear the bid function:
λ bl∗ti (p
b
ti) =
{
0 if pbti ≤ q∗ti
cli if q
∗
ti < p
b
ti ≤ Pi
(60)
is optimal w.r.t. the (DABFC) problem and the optimum x∗.
Proof We will consider first part (i) of the lemma. To illustrate the proof, the expression (59) has been represented
graphically in Fig.2(a). It can be easily verified that the matched energy function associated with the bid function λ bq∗ti
is (Fig.2(b)):
pm∗ti (λ dt ) =

q∗ti if λ dt ≤ λ ti(
λ dt − cli
)
/2cqi if λ ti < λ dt ≤ λ ti
Pi if λ dt > λ ti
(61)
where the threshold prices λ ti and λ ti are defined as:
λ ti = 2c
q
i q
∗
ti+ c
l
i ; λ ti = 2c
q
i Pi+ c
l
i (62)
To prove the part (i) of the lemma it is only necessary to demonstrate that pm∗ti (λ
d,s
t )≡ ps∗ti , where ps∗ti is the value of
the optimal matched energy at scenario s, given by (52). First notice that, if λ dt = λ
d,s
t , the spot price at scenario s,
then the matched energy function (61) can be rewritten as:
pm∗ti (λ
d,s
t ) =

q∗ti if λ
d,s
t ≤ λ ti
θ sti if λ ti < λ
d,s
t ≤ λ ti
Pi if λ d,st > λ ti
(63)
where θ sti is the parameter defined in equation (54). Now, the equivalence pm∗ti (λ
d,s
t ) ≡ ps∗ti = max{q∗ti, pd,sti } can be
easily verified for the three cases of expression (63) (please, refer to Fig. 2(b) for a graphical interpretation of these
three cases):
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b
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θ lti
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λ ti
λ tiλ d,rt λ
d,s
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Optimal bid function λ bq∗ti (p
b
ti) (a) and associated matched energy function p
m∗
it (λ
d,s
t ) (b) for units with quadratic generation costs.
(a) If, for some k ∈ S, λ d,kt ≤ λ ti then θ sti ≤ q∗ti and, by definition (53), pd,kti =max{θ kti,Pi}, which will always be less
than or equal to q∗ti. Then, we can write that pm∗ti (λ
d,k
t ) = q∗ti = max{q∗ti, pd,kti ≤ q∗ti}= pk∗ti .
(b) If, for some l ∈ S, λ ti < λ d,lt ≤ λ ti then q∗ti < θ lti ≤ Pi which, by definition (53), gives pd,lti = θ lti and pm∗ti (λ d,lt ) =
θ lti = max{q∗ti, pd,lti = θ lti > q∗ti}= pl∗ti
(c) If, for some r ∈ S, λ d,rt > λ ti then θ rti > Pi which, together with definition (53), sets pd,rti = Pi and: pm∗ti (λ d,rt ) =
Pi = max{q∗ti, pd,rti = Pi > q∗ti}= pr∗ti
To demonstrate the equivalence pm∗ti (λ
d,s
t )≡ ps∗ti when cqi = 0 (part (ii) of the lemma), observe that the optimal matched
energy function associated with the optimal bid function λ bl∗ti is:
pm∗ti (λ dt ) =
{
q∗ti if λ dt ≤ cli
Pi if λ dt > cli
(64)
which is represented in Fig. 3(b). Expression (64) is equivalent to expression (57), and then, pm∗ti (λ
d,s
t )≡ ps∗ti ∀s ∈ S
¤
Observe that a direct result of lemma 4 is that assumption 1 always holds.
As mentioned before, the (DABFC) problem assures us that, if the optimal bids (59)-(60) are submitted to the Day-
Ahead Market, the expected value of the benefit function B (14)-(16) will be maximized. There are two important
considerations about these optimal bid functions. The first one is that the optimal bid functions (59)-(60) represent
to some extent a generalization of the classical self-commitment problem treated by several authors (Conejo et al.
[6], Gountis and Bakirtzis [7]). Effectively, if the thermal unit i does not contribute to covering futures contracts at
period t (i.e., q∗ti = 0), then the optimal bid function offers the complete production of the thermal plant pbti at its true
marginal cost, 2cqi p
b
ti + c
l
i or c
l
i depending on the generation costs functions. Second, the true bid function required
by the market’s operator in the MIBEL is a stepwise non-decreasing function. The optimal bid function (60) satisfies
this condition, but (59) is not stepwise. This is an approximation commonly adopted in the literature (see Gountis and
Bakirtzis [7]) and does not represent a serious limitation on the practical interest of the model, because it is always
possible to built a posteriori a stepwise approximation of the resulting optimal bid (59).
4. Numerical examples
The model (17)-(26) has been tested with real data of a Spanish GenCo and MIBEL market prices. The model has
been implemented in AMPL (Fourer et al. [27]) and solved with CPLEX [28] using a SunFire X2200 with two dual
core AMD Opteron 2222 processors at 3 GHz and 32 Gb of RAM memory.
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Figure 3: Optimal bid function λ bq∗ti (p
b
ti) (a) and associated matched energy function p
m∗
ti (λ
d,s
t ) (b) for units with linear generation costs.
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e e/MWh e/MWh2 MW MW e e
1 151.08 40.37 0.015 160.0 350.0 412.80 412.80
2 554.21 36.50 0.023 250.0 563.2 803.75 803.75
3 97.56 43.88 0.000 80.0 284.2 244.80 244.80
4 327.02 28.85 0.036 160.0 370.7 438.40 438.40
5 64.97 45.80 0.000 30.0 65.0 100.20 100.20
6 366.08 -13.72 0.274 60.0 166.4 188.40 188.40
7 197.93 36.91 0.020 160.0 364.1 419.20 419.20
8 66.46 55.74 0.000 110.0 313.6 1298.88 1298.88
9 372.14 105.08 0.000 90.0 350.0 1315.44 1315.44
Table 1: Operational characteristics of the thermal units
4.1. Data sources
All the data of this work is public and it has been either downloaded directly from the indicated web pages or
calculated by using some other public data. The sources for all data used in the case studies are:
• Market data: the Day-Ahead Market price has been available at OMEL’s site (OMEL [25]) since January
1998 until today. In this work we use the data from January 1st , 2004 to May 30th,2009. Generic data about
the quantities and clearing prices of the FCs is available at OMIP’s site (OMIP [24]), this data has been used to
define some examples of FCs.
• Generation Company data: the information about the thermal units in the study belongs to a GenCo that
bids daily in the Day-Ahead Market and also participates in the Derivatives Market (Table 1). Most of the
information about the generation units is available at the CNE’s site (CNE [29]).
4.2. Construction of the set of scenarios
The optimization model presented in this work is stochastic due to the presence of a random variable, the Day-
Ahead Market price (see Section 2). This random variable has the characteristics of a financial time series and, in
order to be introduced in the stochastic model, it has to be discretized on a scenario tree. In particular, the model
presented in this work is a two-stage stochastic problem and, for this kind of model, a set of individual scenarios with
its corresponding probabilities is sufficient. In this work, we have observed the following steps in order to obtain the
required scenario set:
1. Time series model: the Spanish Day-Ahead Market price presents the following characteristics: high frequency,
nonconstant mean and variance, multiple seasonality, calendar effect, high volatility and high presence of picks
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|S| c.v. CPU(s) E(benefits)(e) ‖xs−x150‖‖x150‖
10 3360 13 1350830 0.3350
20 5760 55 1085240 0.2997
30 8160 112 1093900 0.2913
40 10560 216 1081010 0.1821
50 12960 444 1107110 0.1764
75 18960 2100 1087860 0.0712
100 24960 3319 1089280 0.0712
150 36960 4244 1084880
|T |= 24; |I|= 9; b.v.= 720
Table 2: Results for different number of scenarios
(Nogales et al. [30]), which are the common characteristics of a financial time series. The market price has been
characterized by an auto-regressive integrated moving average model. We work with the log scale of the price in
order to avoid the nonconstant variance, specifically:
ln(λ d)∼ ARIMA(5,0,2)(8,0,1)24(3,0,3)168
The model is fitted based on the data from 2004 to 2007. The coefficients are estimated by maximum likelihood
estimation.
2. Scenario generation: one of the most usual mechanisms for this discretization is the simulation of prices scenar-
ios for the day in study Kaut and Wallace [31]. Thus, once the model has been fitted we generate 300 simulated
scenarios for the 24 hours of the day in study.
3. Scenario reduction: a set of decision variables is required for each scenario, so the reduction of the number
of scenarios will reduce the dimension of the problem and ease the computational resolution. Following the
algorithm described in Growe-Kuska et al. [32], the set of scenarios has been reduced preserving at maximum
the characteristics of the simulated set.
In stochastic programming models, the number of scenarios is a critical decision. We deal with this problem by
increasing the number of scenarios until the stabilization of the objective function optimal value. The original tree
has 300 scenarios that have been reduced to sets of 150, 100, 75, 50, 40, 30, 20 and 10 scenarios. In table 2 the main
parameters of each test are summarized: number of scenarios (S), number of continuous variables (c.v.), CPU time
in seconds (CPU(s)), the value of the expected benefits (E(benefits)(e)), and the difference in the first stage variables
value between the reduced set and the one with 150 scenarios, given in fraction of unit ( ‖x
s−x150‖
‖x150‖ where x
s = [q∗, u∗]′
∀s ∈ S); the number of binary variables (b.v.) is independent of the number of scenarios and it is equal to 720 for
all instances. The value of E(benefits) only considers the benefit from the Day-Ahead Market (terms (16) and (15)),
ignoring the constant FCs income (14), and corresponds to minus the objective function of the (DABFC) problem. It
can be observed how the CPU time increases with the number of scenarios because of the proportional relationship
between them and the number of continuous variables (the number of binary variables is independent of the number
of scenarios). It can be seen also the stabilization of the value of the objective function when the number of scenarios
grows (Fig. 4(a)) and the convergence to zero of the difference in the optimal value of the first stage decision variables
between each reduced set and the largest one (Fig. 4(b)). Both values converge from approximately 75 scenarios
and the computational time is acceptable. Any increase in the number of scenarios from 75 to 100 does not improve
the optimal solution accuracy enough to justify the 50% increase in the CPU time. Therefore 75 will be the selected
number of scenarios for the computational tests.
4.3. Computational results
A set of computational tests has been performed in order to validate the proposed modeling of the day-ahead
bid with FCs problem. The instances used in the test have 3 bilateral contracts, 9 thermal units and 24 hourly. The
computational tests are done changing the quantity of energy allocated to physical FCs in order to study its influence
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Figure 4: (a) Expected benefits for each reduced set of scenarios (b) First stage variables convergence evaluated as ‖x
s−x150‖
‖x150‖ , x
s = [q∗, u∗]′ ∀s ∈ S
%P E(benefits)
5 1823170
40 1107110
75 -2800460
|T |= 24; |I|= 10; |S|= 75; c.v. = 720; b.v. = 12960
Table 3: Dependency of the Day-Ahead Market benefits with the fraction of the total generation capacity allocated to futures contracts.
in the results. The status of the units before the first interval is fixed as all open, allowing them to be closed or remain
opened at hour 1; this is done in order to give more freedom to the unit commitment.
The quantity allocated to FCs is confidential and therefore there is no real public data for the units in the study.
The set of computational tests presented is based on the percentage of the total energy generation capacity that the
GenCo has allocated in FCs, %P=∑∀ j∈F L j/∑∀i∈I Pi. For this case study, we include the 9 available units distributed
in one or more of the 3 UCPs created, each of them corresponding to one FC. In table 3 the main parameters of the
computational test are summarized for three different values of %P: 5%, 40% and 75%. The computational time for
the 3 cases is approximately the same but the value of the expected benefits differs. Observe that when %P= 75% the
GenCo experiences a loss in the Day-Ahead Market, which should be compensated with the FCs incomes (14).
Figure 5 shows the optimal bid function for unit 1 at interval 12, λ bq∗12,1(p
b
12,1) (sec. 3, equation (59)), for the differ-
ent values of %P considered. The plot represents an adaptation of the optimal bid function provided by the model to
the real bid function that the GenCo has to submit to the MIBEL Day- Ahead Market operator. This real bid function
is composed of ten pairs (energy, price) with increasing price (points (a)) that can be represented as a stepwise increas-
ing curve starting at the point defined by the instrumental price offer (q∗12,1,0). The following steps are constructed
by following the optimal bid function, in a way that the coordinates of the points (a) are (pb12,1,λ
bq∗
12,1(p
b
12,1)), with
the values of the bid energy pb12,1 evenly distributed between q
∗
12,1 and P12. Notice that for the first case (solid line)
the unit has no energy allocated to FCs so the instrumental offer’s energy is the minimum operational limit (160MW)
because, as the unit is committed, the matched energy has to be at least this quantity. For the other two cases the
energy allocated to FCs is 186MW (dotted line) and 256MW (dashed line). In the following analysis, the percentage
of available energy used for physical FCs will be fixed at 40%.
Figure 6(a) shows variable q∗ti, the instrumental price bid, energy for each unit and interval. The values shown
in the ordinate axis are the minimum and maximum power capacity of each unit. This instrumental price bid can be
either the quantity allocated to FCs or the minimum operational limit of the unit. Fig. 6(a) also represents the unit
commitment, because if the unit is not producing the minimum operational limit it means the unit is off. We can see
that unit 5 starts-up at 10 a.m. and units 2, 8 and 9 start-up after 6 p.m. This behavior is related to the prices structure
because in the MIBEL the highest prices are at noon and in the evening, the peak hours being after 6 p.m.
Figure 6(b) represents variable f ∗ti j, the optimal economic dispatch of each FC. This representation shows how
the contract is settled among the different units of each UCP. Three kinds of physical FCs have been considered, 200
MWh in a weekly contract, 500 MWh in a monthly contract and 500 MWh in a yearly contract. It can be observed
that every unit of a given UCP contributes to the corresponding FC in at least one interval. Notice how in the off-peak
hours (lower clearing prices), if possible, each contract is settled by the cheapest unit in the UCP, for example unit 7
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Figure 6: (a) Optimal instrumental price bid energy q∗it for each unit and interval (b) Economic dispatch of each futures contracts, fit j
16
0 160 350
0
2
4
6
0 250 560
0
2
4
6
0 80 280
0
2
4
6
0 160 370
0
2
4
6
Sp
ot
 p
ric
e 
(c/
kW
h)
0 30 65
0
2
4
6
0 60 165
0
2
4
6
0 160 360
0
2
4
6
0 110 310
0
2
4
6
Energy(x1000kWh)
0 110 310
0
2
4
6
Thermal 1 Thermal 2 Thermal 3 
Thermal 4 Thermal 5 Thermal 6
Thermal 7 Thermal 8 Thermal 9
(160,0) (250,0) (102,0) 
(197,0) (30,0) (63,0) 
(178,0) (110,0) (110,0) 
Figure 7: Bidding curve for each unit at hour 23
in the yearly contract or unit 6 in the monthly contract. Specifically, as unit 7 cannot generate all the energy needed
for the yearly contract, unit 3 has to contribute covering the rest of the contract. For this reason the weekly contract is
not fully covered by unit 3, which is the cheapest one, but by unit 1, since unit 3 is generating for the yearly contract.
In the case of the monthly contract, since the maximum power capacity of unit 6 is insufficient, the contract must be
covered with the help of the next cheapest unit, unit 4. The results of the peak hours are not as easily interpretable
because Day-Ahead Market incomes are greater and its relation with production costs allows all the units to participate
both in FCs and day-ahead bidding.
Figure 7 shows the optimal bid curves for each committed thermal unit at hour 12. The numerical values shown
in the abscissa axis indicate the minimum and maximum power capacity. The first interval is always the instrumental
price bid, which is indicated in parenthesis as (price, quantity). Units 3, 5 and 9 have linear generation costs and its
real bid coincides with the optimal bid function λ bl∗ti expressed in equation (60). The rest of the units have quadratic
generation costs and the function represented corresponds to the adaptation of the optimal bid functions λ bq∗ti (equation
(59) to the real stepwise bid function built as in figure 5. Notice that there are some thermal units that have qti greater
than the minimum power capacity, specifically units 3, 4, 6 and 7, this fact is a direct consequence of the participation
of these units in the FC being covered.
In summary, this results give the GenCo the optimal bidding strategy following the market operator rules. The
main difference with other bidding strategies is that the optimal value of qti corresponds directly to the optimal zero
price bid, that is to say, the first step of the step-wise bidding curve.
5. Conclusions
This work has developed a new quadratic mixed-integer stochastic programming model, for the optimal Day-
Ahead Bid with Future Contracts problem (DABFC). The optimal solution of our model determines the unit com-
mitment of the thermal units, the optimal instrumental price bidding strategy for the generation company and the
economic dispatch of the committed FCs for each hour so as to maximize the benefits arising from the Day-Ahead
Market while satisfying the thermal operational constraints and the MIBEL’s rules concerning the integration of the
energy of the Physical Futures Contract in the Day-Ahead Market. As a result of the study of the properties of the
optimal solution of the (DABFC) problem, the proposed model also provides the analytical expression of the optimal
bid functions that ensures the maximization of the long run expected benefits. The expression for the optimal bid
functions represents a generalization of the marginal cost bid function for those utilities that must integrate the settled
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energy of the physical FCs within their bid to the Day-Ahead Market obeying the MIBEL regulation. The model was
implemented and solved with real data of MIBEL market prices and a Spanish generation company with participation
in the Derivatives and Day-Ahead Markets. The results of the computational tests validate the model and show the
influence in the optimal bidding strategy of the generation company of the participation in physical futures contract.
A. Notation
A.1. Parameters
cbt , c
l
t , c
q
t : constant, linear and quadratic coefficients of the generation cost function of unit t.
co f ft , cont : shut-down and start-up cost of unit t.
F : set of futures contracts.
Ft : set of futures contracts in which unit t participates.
L j: due settled energy of contract j.
λ d= {λ d1 , . . . ,λ di , . . . ,λ dI }: clearing prices of the |I| Day-Ahead Markets.
λ d,s= {λ d,s1 , . . . ,λ d,si , . . . ,λ d,sI }: clearing prices of the |I| Day-Ahead Markets for scenario s.
λ fj : settlement price of futures contract j.
λ it , λ it : threshold prices used in the definition of the optimal matched energy function pm∗it .
mino f ft , minont : operational minimum idle and in service time of unit t.
Ps= P[λ d = λ d,s]: probability of scenario s.
Pt , Pt : lower and upper bound on the energy generation of a committed unit t.
pd,sit : auxiliary parameter used in the definition of the optimal matched energy p
s∗
it of unit t at interval i and scenario s.
S: set of scenarios.
T : set of thermal units.
Tj: set of thermal units that participates in contract j.
T ∗oni : set of committed units at interval i over the optimal solution.
θ sit : auxiliary parameter used in the definition of the optimal matched energy p
s∗
it of unit t at interval i and scenario s.
A.2. Variables and multipliers
ait : binary variable indicating the shutting-down of unit t at interval i
eit : binary variable to indicate the turning-on of unit t at interval i.
uit : binary variable representing the on-off operating status of the unit t at interval i.
fit j: continuous variable representing the energy of the future contract j allocated to thermal unit t at interval i.
psit : continuous variable of scenario s for the matched energy of unit t at interval i.
qit : continuous variable standing for the energy of the instrumental price offer of unit t at interval i
pi: Lagrange multiplier of the future contracts energy dispatching constraints (37).
µ˜: Lagrange multiplier of the instrumental price offer constraints (38).
µ , µˆ and µ : Lagrange multipliers of the bounding and coupling constraints (39)-(41).
µ˘: Lagrange multipliers of the non-negativity of variables f .
A.3. Functions
B: Day-Ahead and Futures Market benefit function.
λ bit (p
b
it): bid function of unit t at the i
th spot market.
λ bq∗it (p
b
it), λ
lq∗
it (p
b
it): optimal bid function at the i
th spot market for a unit t with quadratic generation cost.
pmit (λ
d
i ): matched energy function providing the matched energy of unit t at interval i associated to a given bid function λ
b
it for a fixed
clearing price λ .
pm∗it (λ di ): matched energy function associated to the optimal bid function λ
bq∗
it or λ
bl∗
it .
Units: costs and prices are in e/MWh and energy terms in MWh.
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